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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~\LARY J. HOWARD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
RINGSBY TRUCK LINES, INC. 
a corporation, and H 0 RACE 
BYINGTON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 8030 
BHIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action brought for the wrongful death of 
Francis A. Howard and of Allen Howard, by the wife and 
mother, Mary Howard. 
Francis A. Howard, the husband, age 41 (R. 157) 
and his son, Allen Howard, age 14, on the 19th day of 
October, 1951, left Salt Lake City to go deer hunting and 
met Lloyd Howard, a brother, his wife and daughter, 
at the mouth of Parleys Canyon (R. 57). Frank was 
driving a jeep pickup truck (R. 57) he borrowed from 
Henry Day of Draper, Utah, his employer, and Allen, 
his son, was riding with him. Lloyd Howard, his wife 
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and daughter were riding in Lloyd's Studebaker Sedan. 
They proceeded to Heber City, then when half way up 
Daniels Canyon, they met other brothers repairing a 
trailer tire and they stopped and helped ( R. 85). The 
other brothers were Ewan, Brady and Ren (R. 86). 
From this point Frank started first in the jeep pickup 
and was followed by Lloyd, his wife and daughter. A 
little further up Daniels Canyon, Lloyd passed Frank. 
Just before they arrived at Current Creek on Highway 
40 (R. 87), Lloyd stopped to look at some deer and F'rank 
and his son stopped also (R. 87). The last time Lloyd 
saw Frank's pickup truck was just before they got to 
Fruitland when he saw him through the rear vision 
mirror. Lloyd drove on Highway 40 to the Junction of 
the Tabiona Road where he turned North on the Tabiona 
Road, drove over Fruitland Bench and stopped to wait 
for Frank (R. 88). Frank, with his son, proceeded along 
Highway 40 and came down the hill to cross the Red 
Creek Bridge (R. 29) (R. 55) (R. 90) (R. 115) (R. 121); 
there the jeep pickup hit the Southeast corner of the 
bridge and proceeded across the highway and collided, 
on approximately the North edge of the oiled surface of 
the road, at a point 225 feet East of the bridge (R. 32), 
with a truck driven by Defendant Byington and operated 
by Defendant Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. 
At the scene of the accident there is a road running 
to the South and a relatively level area to the North 
side of the highway designed to allow West bound ve-
hicles to turn into the road running south. The Ringsby 
Truck, driven by the Defendant Byington and operated 
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-I 
by the Defendant Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., apparently 
ran over the jeep pickup truck, then it proceeded across 
the turn out area to the North of the highway and finally 
collided with some large boulders 135 feet from the point 
of in1pact, (R. 34), and cmne to a stop. The jeep pickup 
truck had been knocked North and West some 86 feet 
from the point of impact when it started to burn, it came 
to rest approximately 15 feet to the rear of the Ringsby 
truck. 
The Rings by truck was powered by a 300 horse 
power diesel engine in a 1951 l(enworth tandem axle 
tractor and was pulling a Fruehauf stainless steel trailer 
35 feet in length. The entire unit was 53 feet 6 inches in 
length. It had been loaded at Grand Island, Nebraska, 
with explosives, and the gross weight of the truck, trailer 
and cargo was 60,900 pounds. Apparently, Defendant 
Byington, the driver of the Ringsby Truck, and his relief 
driver, who was riding in the sleeper part of the truck, 
abandoned the two vehicles immediately after the colli-
swn. 
Y ernon A. Williams and Stanley Sutherland, driving 
easterly along the highway, came upon the truck and 
burning pickup, stopped, found a man's body projecting 
from the burning pickup, then noticed a sign "Explo-
sives" on the Rings by truck (R. 13, 14 and 15) and then 
drove their car to the East around the corner of the 
mountain and stopped. Williams flagged the West 
bound traffic and Sutherland went West across Red 
Creek and flagged the East bound traffic ( R. 19'). Floyd 
Hartman, driving West along Highway 40 for the pur-
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pose of hunting South along Red Creek came to the 
stopped cars, was told there was a truck of explosives 
about to explode. He went down along the side of the 
dugway (R. 72, 73 and 74) and found that the Ringsby 
truck load of explosives was not on fire and probably 
would not get on fire. He inspected the wreck heard a 
moaning sound and found Allen Howard some 10 or 12 
feet East of the jeep pickup truck, his breathing in a 
pool of blood making the noise (R. 75). He endeavored 
to clean up Allen Howard, took him in his arms, ran up 
the highway and pursuaded three unknown boys to take 
Allen to Duchesne, which they did. Allen died shortly 
after arrival (R. 77). Hartman then started the traffic 
moving West and Glen Wing, a Radio Technician for 
the State Highway Patrol, was in the traffic on the West 
side of Red Creek. Wing went down to the scene of the 
accident, helped put out the fire, and removed the body of 
Francis A. Howard. Defendant Byington, the driver of 
the Ringsby truck told Wing at that time that his speed 
was 45 miles per hour as he was going West approaching 
the Red Creek Bridge and he said, according to Mr. \Ving 
that "He observed this pickup truck as it hit the abut-
ment of the bridge and then continued on down the high-
way and that is the last he saw of it (R. 29)."Wing says 
he didn't ask the driver how fast the pickup truck was 
going. There was no evidence, on either the oiled portion 
of the road East of the point of impact or on the graveled 
portion of the turn-out indicating the application of 
brakes before the impact (R. 40). Byington, the Ringsby 
truck driver, apparently told a lot of people that the 
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pickup truck hit the Southeast abutment of the bridge. 
Each of the witnesses quoted him differently. Lloyd 
Howard said that the driver told him, "He saw the jeep 
hit the bridge. He didn't see it again" (R. 90). He told 
Brady, however, "It looked like it hit the corner of the 
bridge and went out of control and it cut across, cross-
wise, across the road and he didn't see it any more until 
he felt the impact." (R. 115). He told Dale Howard, 
"He saw the jeep truck hit the bridge; he figured it hit 
the bridge and it came across the road until it hit his 
truck." (R. 21). 
The truck of the Defendant was coming down a 6% 
grade and the jeep pickup fron1 the point of hitting the 
bridge to the point of impact was going up a 6% grade 
(R. 130). All of the stopping distance prior to the point 
of ilnpact would have been upon the hard surface part 
of the road. Most of the stopping distance after the im-
pact would have been upon gravel (R. 139). The brakes 
of the truck at the time would not have been heated but 
would have been cold (R.142). Taking into consideration 
the speed of 45 miles per hour and assuming that all of 
the stopping could have been accomplished on gravel, the 
truck could have been stopped in 130 feet, (R. 148) and 
including a reaction time of 34 of a second it could have 
been stopped in 180 feet. 
The Defendants moved the Court to dismiss the First 
Cause of Action on the grounds that the evidence con-
~~ elusively showed, as a matter of law, that Francis A. 
~!' Howard was negligent in being on the wrong side of the 
]t highway and there was no evidence that Defendant By-
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ington was negligent and also moved to dismiss the 
Second Cause of Action on the grounds that as a matter 
of law there was no act or conduct of Byington which was 
the legal cause of the accident, resulting in the death of 
Allen Howard (R. 168-169). The Court granted both 
motions (R. 170). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
FOR REVERSAL 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
A. At the moment that the jeep pickup truck, being 
driven by Frank Howard struck the Southeast corner of 
the Red Creek bridge, which Defendant Byington saw at 
the time it happened, Byington ought to have realized the 
danger in which F'rank Howard was placed and there 
was sufficient time before the collision so that Byington, 
by the exercise of reasonable care and by the use of the 
instrumentalities under his control and under the condi-
tions then existing, could have avoided the accident. 
II. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFEND-
ANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE 
OF ACTION. 
A. When Byington saw the pickup jeep in which 
Allen Howard was riding strike the Southeast corner of 
the Red Creek bridge he should have realized the danger 
in which Allen Howard was placed and thereafter Bying-
ton had ample time, by the exercise of reasonable care, 
and by the use of the instrumentalities under his control, 
and under the conditions then existing, to have avoided 
the accident. 
III. THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING THE FIND-
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INGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDG-
MENT IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER. 
~\.. Paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact concerning 
the First Cause of Action is erroneous in that the court 
finds that the Plaintiff has failed to produce any evi-
dence to prove the Defendant was gulity of any negli-
gence which approxi1nately caused the collision and sub-
sequent death of Francis A. Howard. 
B. Paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact concerning 
the Second Cause of Action is erroneous in that it finds 
that Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that 
the Defendants were guilty of any negligence whatsoever 
which approximately caused the collision and subsequent 
death of Allen Howard. 
C. That the Judgment is erroneous wherein it or-
dered, adjudged and decreed that the First and Second 
Cause of Action be disrnissed upon the merits and with 
prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
Frank Howard, an automobile mechanic, driving a 
jeep four wheel drive pickup truck in an Easterly di-
1 rection on Highway 40 on October 19, 1951, with a son, 
Allen, age 1-1, as his passenger, in the exercise of due and 
reasonable care under all of the circumstances, struck 
the Southeast corner of Red Creek bridge, throwing the 
jeep pickup truck out of control (R .. 184) which caused 
the pickup truck to travel across the highway into the 
path of Defendant's oncoming vehicle. 
Defendant's truck at said time was traveling at 45 
mph. The evidence does not disclose the speed of the jeep 
pickup truck nor does it disclose the reason for the jeep 
pickup truck hitting the Southeast corner of the bridge. 
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The fact is that the jeep pickup did hit the corner of tht 
bridge and was thrown out of control, which fact was dis-
covered at the time it occurred by the Defendant. There-
after the jeep traveled 225 feet across the highway to the 
North shoulder where it was literally run over by De-
fendant's truck. 
The evidence does not disclose how far East of the 
point of impact the Defendant's truck was at the time 
the driver, Byington, saw the jeep pickup hit the bridge. 
The following table might be helpful on this question: 
(a) Jeep moving at 40 mph. travels 58.7 feet per 
second. Travels 225 feet in 2.84 seconds. 
(b) Jeep moving at 45 mph. travels 66 feet per 
second. Travels 225 feet in 3.41 seconds. 
(c) Jeep moving at 50 mph. travels 73.3 feet per 
second. Travels 225 feet in 3.7 seconds. 
(d) Jeep moving 60 mph. travels 88 feet per 
second. Travels 225 feet in 2.56 seconds. 
The testimony is undisputed that the truck speed 
was 45 mph., and we assume that is a reasonable speed 
and the driver of the jeep, in the absence of any other 
testimony, was driving at a reasonable speed, which for 
the purpose of this argument would be 45 mph., and we 
further assume that neither the jeep or the truck reduced 
their speed up to the place of impact, this being the most 
favorable assumption to sustain the trial court's rulings, 
then the truck was 450 feet from the bridge and 225 feet 
from the point of impact at the time that the driver dis-
covered the danger in which the two deceased subjects 
of this lawsuit were placed by the collision with the 
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bridge. If we further assuine a % second reaction time, 
for the driver of the truck, before acting, this being the 
only testhnony on the subject (R. 149), the driver, after 
the reaction ti1ue, was still 384lf2 feet from the bridge or 
159.5 feet from the point of impact. The only testimony 
on stopping distance is that of Dr. F'rank Y. Harris, who 
testified that after taking into consideration the G% 
down grade on which the truck was traveling and the fact 
that part of the travel was on oil and part on gravel, 
and assuming that the co-efficient of friction for the 
truck was that of gravel for the entire distance, this as-
sumption again being most favorable to Defendant, still 
the truck could have been stopped in 130 feet (R. 148). 
There is no evidence that the truck applied its brakes 
at any time (See statement of counsel R. 131), or at-
tempted to change its course or do anything to avoid col-
liding with the jeep pickup truck. It hit the jeep with 
such force that it actually threw it 86 feet (R. 26), then 
traveled on a distance of 135 feet (R. 26), to collide with 
some big boulders and did extensive damage to the truck 
as a result of the impact with the boulders. (See exhibits 
24, 25, 26 and 27). 
Byington's legal responsibilities as he came West on 
Highway 40 approaching the Red Creek bridge were, 
1. To keep a look-out for other users of the high-
way, 
2. To have his truck under such control that he 
could, by the exercise of reasonable care 
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3. To so drive the truck that at all times he 
could, as a reasonable man, steer or stop the 
vehicle so as to avoid harm to others. 
~.,his Court has had occasion, many times, to pass 
upon what has generally come to be known of as the "last 
clear chance doctrine", in 
Watkins v. Utah Poultry, 251 Pac. 2d 668, 
Utah 1952. 
This court approved of 
as follows: 
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 2, 
Sec. 479, P. 1253 
"S. 479. Defendant's Last Clear Chance. 
"A plaintiff who has negligently subjected 
himself to a risk of harm from the defendant's 
subsequent negligence may recover for harm 
caused thereby if, immediately preceding the 
harm, 
(a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the 
exercise of reasonable vigilance and care, 
and 
(b) the defendant 
(i) knows of the plaintiff's situation 
and realizes the helpless peril in-
volved therein; or 
(ii) knows of the plaintiff's situation 
and has reason to realize the peril 
involved therein; or 
(iii) would have discovered the plain-
tiff's situation and thus had rea-
son to realize the plaintiff's help-
less peril had he exercised the 
10 
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vigilance which it was his duty to 
the plaintiff to exercise, and 
(e) thereafter is neligent in failing to utilize 
with reasonable care and cornpetence 
hi~ then existing ability to avoid harm-
ing the plaintiff." 
The situation presented to Byington was a jeep pick-
up truck striking the Southeast abutment at the end of the 
100 foot long narrow ( :.W feet wide) Red Creek Bridge 
and going out of control. Byington at the moment of the 
impact between the pickup truck and the bridge was dis-
charging his legal responsibilities, to-wit, he saw the 
pickup hit the bridge, he was driving his truck at a 
reasonable rate of speed ( 45 In ph.). There is nothing 
in the evidence which would indicate he did not have his 
truck under control so that he could have steered or 
stopped the truck and thereby have avoided doing harm 
to the occupants of the jeep pickup truck. At that mo-
ment Byington was driving upon a relatively narrow oil 
road, down a 6% grade, and could have stopped, includ-
ing his reaction time, in 180 feet. He didn't stop. There 
is some evidence from which the jury could find that 
from the time of the impact of the jeep with the bridge 
to the tilne of the collision between the jeep pickup and 
the Rings by truck, Byington failed to keep any kind of 
a lookout. As a matter of fact, one witness quotes By-
ington as saying he did not see the jeep pickup from the 
time of the collision with the bridge to the time the jeep 
collided with his truck (R. 29). The evidence is rather 
clear that he did not reduce the speed of his vehicle and 
although Byington was under the obligation of operating 
11 
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his vehicle upon the right half of the road, 44-6-54, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, that obligation is relative and as 
stated in 
Vol. 2, Restatement of the Law of Torts Page 
754 
"Thus a statute or ordinance requiring all 
persons to drive on the right side of the road may 
be construed as subject to an exception permitting 
travelers to drive on the other side, if so doing 
is likely to prevent rather than cause the acci-
dents, which is the purpose of the statute or ordi-
nance to prevent." 
See also 
24 A. L. R. 1308 
63 A. L. R. 280 
The evidence is undisputed that the collision between the 
jeep pickup and the Ringsby truck involved bringing the 
jeep pickup in contact with the right front half of the 
Ringsby truck and the point of impact was on the North 
edge of the hard surface portion of the road. The jury 
could have found the fact to be that Byington, had he 
kept a proper lookout and had he kept his truck under 
proper control, could have avoided the collision by doing 
either of two things, either by turning his truck a matter 
of three or four feet to the left, and avoided colliding 
with the jeep pickup, or stopping or even reducing his 
speed and have avoided running over the jeep pickup 
with 61000 pounds of steel and explosives. 
The court by its findings and by its granting the 
Motions to Dismiss in effect has said there is no evidence 
from which the jury might find the Defendant negligent, 
12 
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which in effect is another \vay of saying that the law is 
that when a person traveling upon the highways sees an 
approaching vehicle go out of control that he has no obli-
gation to. stop or to so steer his vehicle as to avoid col-
liding with the vehicle out of control. This is exactly 
what driver Byington did in the instant case. His negli-
gence consists of omissions, in not watching the course 
of the jeep pickup after it collided with the bridge, in 
not reducing the speed of his truck so that he could have 
stopped had the jeep pickup come within the path of the 
Ringsby truck, and when he saw the jeep pickup crossing 
the highway in front of his vehicle in not steering his 
vehicle to the left and avoiding the collision. 
The court having found the fact to be that the jeep 
pickup "went out of control" when it hit the Southeast 
corner of the Red Creek bridge (See Finding No. 5, 
First Cause of Action R. 174, Finding No. 4, Second 
Cause of Action R. 175) found a fact which was undis-
puted in the testimony and certainly a fact which the 
jury would be justified in finding had the trial court 
allowed the case to go to the jury. 
A presumption of due care attended Francis Howard, 
: 1 at least up to the time that his jeep pickup hit the bridge. 
: 1 There being no evidence as to what caused the jeep to hit 
the bridge, it is pure speculation whether it was caused 
by the negligence of Francis Howard or as the result 
of an unavoidable accident, such as a blown out tire or 
mechanical failure of the steering apparatus. 
~I It is Plaintiff's contention that at the time the 
Howard pickup jeep struck the bridge, which was seen 
13 
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by Byington, he was, as a matter of law, alerted to the 
potential danger in which the Howards were placed and 
that he had a continuing responsibility to watch the course 
of the jeep, bring his truck under such control that he 
could have stopped or steered his vehicle and avoided 
colliding with the rampaging jeep. This principle of law 
is laid down in the case of 
Smith v. Gould, 110 ,V. Va. 579, 159 S.E. 53 
W.Va. 1931 
where Plaintiff's decedent alighted from a bus on the 
right-hand side of the road, walked back along the side 
of the road to the rear of the bus, where she started to 
cross the street and was struck by Defendant's car. The 
highway was straight at the point of collision. :Mrs. Smith 
the decedent, did not look to her right, the direction 
from which the Defendant was coming. The Defendant 
saw someone alight from the bus when he was about 600 
feet from it but he did not watch the person and did not 
again see the decedent until he was too close to her to 
avoid striking her, although he could have stopped his 
car in approximately its length. The court affirmed a 
verdict for the Plaintiff and among other things said, 
"We think it is a sound principle that the last 
clear chance doctrine is properly extended to a 
case where an automobilist, by reason of failure 
by him in his plain duty to maintain a lookout for 
the persons and property of others on the high-
way, commensurate with the danger indicated by 
attendant facts and surrounding circumstances 
known to him, and which are such as to have put 
him on the alert, causes injury to a pedestrian 
(though such pedestrian was himself concurrently 
14 
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negligent), where the peril should have been seen 
and cmnprehended by the automobilist and the 
injury a voided in the exercise of reasonable care 
coiniueusurate with the situation. Such case con-
stitutes an exception to the general rule which 
precludes reeovery by a plaintiff whose negligence 
has concurred with the defendant's." 
See also 
Leinbach L'. Pidcu·ick Greyhound Line, 38 
Kan. 50, 23 Pac. 2d -±-±9, Kan. 1933. 
The court had a situation smnewhat similar to the 
case at bar before it in the case of 
Farrell L Cameron, 98 Utah 68, 94 Pac. 2d 
1068, Utah 1939. 
where the Plaintiff, a passenger in the Cayias car sued 
the Defendant for personal injuries resulting from a 
collision between the Cayias car and the Defendant. The 
evidence was that the Defendant observed the Cayias 
car when more than 100 feet away, to have been partially 
on his left-hand side of the highway (the right hand side 
for the Defendant) and under those facts the court found 
there was ample time and roon1 for the Defendant to 
have turned to the right and avoided the collision. Judge 
Wade stated: 
"But the serious question in this case is 
whether the defendant was negligent in failing to 
turn his car slightly to his right and thereby avoid 
a collision. * * * 
"The defendant could see the on-coming car; 
could see that if both cars continued in their 
course there would be a collision. Then the mere 
fact that the approaching car continued in its 
15 
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course without making any move to turn was suffi-
cient to warn the defendant that the driver of the 
on-coming car did not intend to turn and that it 
was his duty to make the turn before it was too 
late. 
"On this point, in Saw v. Wilcox, Mo . .App. 
224 S. W. 58, 59, in discussing this question the 
court said: 'It may be that each of the parties 
approached too near the other '"' * * before making 
any move to avert a collision. Certainly one of the 
parties did so. The Plaintiff's driver says that 
he was driving about 15 miles per hour, and with-
out slackening his speed came squarely toward 
and in the pathway of defendant's car till he was 
within 15 to 20 feet of same, before turning to go 
round him. It was, however, primarily defend-
ant's duty to seasonably turn to the right and clear 
the way; but, when plaintiff saw he was not doing 
this, he should have put his car under control, and 
not waited till it was too late to turn aside.' 
"It is our opinion that every driver who is 
taking reasonable care in driving his car will not 
stop to consider for even a mon1ent whether the 
other driver is on his side of the road or not, 
where, as here, he has ample time and space to 
do so, but will move over and not take a chance, 
and avoid a collision. .A driver who refuses to 
turn and a void a collision under those circum-
stances, simply because he was on his right-hand 
side of the road, and the approaching car was 
slightly on its left-hand side of the road, would 
certainly be guilty of negligence. It is true that 
there was always a chance, up until it was too late 
for the defendant to turn, that the driver of the 
approaching car would make the turn slightly 
to the right and avoid a collision, and it is also 
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true that the driver of the approaching car, being 
on the wrong side of the road, had a greater duty 
to make this turn than did the defendant. But 
where, as in this case, the defendant had ample 
time and space to make the turn, the turn requir-
ed being so slight that it could not in any way 
place defendant in danger or even inconvenience 
hiin, an.d where the risk of collision was fraught 
with such great possibilities of harm, not only to 
the defendant himself but also the driver of the 
approaching automobile and the other occupants 
thereof, the court was arnply justified in finding 
the defendant was guilty of negligence. 
"And unless there is something out of the 
ordinary it would be impossible to say that the 
approaching car would not tU:rn to its proper 
side of the road, and it would never be safe for 
the car on its right-hand side of the road to turn 
to its left-hand side, because its driver could not 
be sure that the driver of the approaching car on 
the wrong side of the road would not turn to its 
right side of the road. 
"On the other hand, there are many authori-
ties, and we have found none to the contrary, 
which hold that where an automobile which is be-
ing driven on its right-hand side of the street is 
approaching another automobile which is being 
driven in the opposite direction and on its left-
hand or wrong side of the street, it is the duty of 
the driver who is on the right-hand side of the 
street to use reasonable care to avoid a collision, 
even if the approaching car is being driven, in vi-
olation of the law of the road, on the wrong side 
of the street. 
"In Berry on Automobiles, 6th Ed., 842, Sec. 
995, it is said: 'A motorist on the right side of 
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the road must exercise reasonable care to avoid 
a collision with a car on the wrong side.'" 
Other cases to the same effect 
wherein 
Mooney v. Cha,pdelaine, 11 At. 2d 713, N.H. 
Blashfield Encyclorwdia of Auto Law & Prac-
tice, Pa. Ed. Hec. 787 
is quoted as follows : 
"Whether it is the duty of a driver on the 
right side of the road seeing an auto approach on 
the wrong side of the road to stop to avoid a col-
lision cannot ordinarily be detern1ined as a matter 
of law. The driver who is on the right side may 
assurne on the first appearance of the other ve-
hicle, that it will change its course, and the par-
ticular point of time when he is no longer war-
ranted in indulging in such assumption it is for 
the jury in an action for injuries resulting from 
a collision." 
See also 
Williams 1J. Brown, 181 So. 679, La. App. 
Assuming negligence on the part of Francis A. How-
ard, which the jury might have found proximately con-
tributed to his death, the jury still, upon the evidence 
presented, should have had the opportunity of passing 
on the question, as to whether the Defendants had a last 
clear chance to have avoided the collision resulting in 
Francis A. Howard's death, and if they should have so 
found, that there was such a last clear chance they eould 
have found for the Plaintiff on her First Cause of Ac-
tion. 
Upon the Second Cause of Action, the one for the 
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death of Allen Howard, there is no contention that he 
was in any way negligent: so the ~econd Cause of Action 
is squarely within the holding in 
Farrell v. Cameron, Supra. 
As a practical 1natter, the sole question before the 
court on this appeal is whether or not the Defendant was 
negligent, the court having found in its Findings of F'act 
that the Defendant was not negligent. The guest cases 
by this fact are made authorities for reversal in this case. 
In the case of 
De'WYllis v. Jlaher, 197 Wash. 286, 84 Pac. 2d 
1029, Wash. 1938. 
a passenger in a bus which collided with a vehicle travel-
ing in the opposite direction upon the bus's right-hand 
side of the highway, sued for injuries. From an adverse 
decision the Plaintiff appealed and the court said, 
"It is sufficient to state that the question of 
whether or not the stage was proceeding at an ex-
eessive and unlawful rate of speed and whether 
the stage driver exercised reasonable care under 
the circumstances in applying his brakes and in 
not pulling off the highway to the shoulder of the 
road, and if either such affirmative action or fail-
ure so to act were the proximate cause of the col-
lision, presented questions to the jury." 
See also 
Johnson v. Burnham, 198 Wash. 500, 88 Pac. 
2d 833, Wash. 1938. 
where there was a head-on collision between two vehicles 
upon a narrow bridge, wherein the court had the follow-
ing to say: 
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"(2) In the case of Luther v. Pacific Fruit 
& Produce Co., 143 Wash. 308, 255 P. 365, 367, this 
court said: 'One driving an automobile along a 
public highway, who sees a car approaching on the 
wrong side of the road, has a right to assume that 
the driver thereof will observe the law of the road 
and seasonably turn over to the right, and he 
may proceed upon this assumption until he sees, 
or in the exercise of ordinary care ought to see, 
that his assumption is unwarranted. When the 
appellant became aware, or in the exercise of ordi-
nary care should have become aware, that an acci-
dent was imminent, he was bound to look out for 
himself and to exercise the care of a prudent man 
for the purpose of avoiding an accident.' " 
l\1:any of the physical facts in the case at bar are simi-
lar to those in the case of 
llforby v. Rogers, 252 Pac. 2d 231, l'tah 1953. 
where the court said, 
"Reasonable minds, however, would be justi-
fied in inferring negligence on the part of defend-
ant from circumstantial physical facts also 
brought out in the record. For example the lack 
of skid or brake marks would justify an inference 
against defendant's purported 'quick action' to 
avoid the accident. The final position of the auto-
mobile in the canal would justify a finding that 
defendant was traveling faster than his testimony 
indicated and that such speed indicated his lack of 
control over the automobile at the time of the 
accident. Furthermore, the testimony in regard 
to the boy's injuries would justify a finding that 
the deceased was struck with great force and was 
not just 'tipped over' as defendant and his wife 
testified. The fact that extent of injury to the 
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bicyrle consisted of a darnaged rear mud guard 
and there wa8 no injury to the front of the bicycle 
would justify a finding that the boy did not turn 
into defendant as wa~ contended, but was rather 
struck fr01n behind. ln addition to this reasonable 
minds could find from the point of impact and the 
position of deceased's body, that the boy had not 
made any sudden turn but had gradually veered 
over onto the west portion of the highway before 
he was struck." 
Applying the facts in the case at bar we can say the lack 
of brake or skidding marks would justify an inference 
that Defendant failed to do anything to avoid the acci-
dent. The final position of the truck, the distance of 
travel and the damage done to it when it collided with 
the boulder will justify a finding that the Defendant was 
traveling faster than his statement to the witnesses in-
dicated and that such speed indicated loss of control 
over the truck at the time of the accident. In the case at 
bar there is no doubt that the jeep pickup was hit with 
great force and violence. In addition to the fact the jeep 
pickup hit the right-hand half of the Ringsby truck would 
justify the jury in finding that if the Defendant Bying-
ton had been keeping a proper lookout and had turned 
his truck slightly, a 1natter of 4 or 5 feet to his left, or 
the South side of the highway, that he would have avoid-
ed the collision. 
The editors of American Law Reports have a very 
extensive annotation on the last clear chance doctrine, 
92 A. L. R. 47 
The editor's conclusion after 100 pages of annotation is 
stated in the following language: 
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"The courts are practically agreed that the 
doctrine applies upon the assumption that the 
defendant actually discovered, and in the circum-
stances ought to have realized, the danger in time 
by the exercise of reasonable care, by the use of 
the instrumentalities then under his control and 
under the conditions then existing, to avert the 
accident, even though the defendant's conduct is 
properly characterized merely as negligence." 
It is admitted by all concerned that the Defendant 
actually discovered the hazardous condition in which the 
two deceased members of the Howard family found them-
selves. This danger was discovered by the Defendant 
Byington in time so that by the exercise of reasonable 
care and by the use of the instrumentalities then under 
his control and under the conditions then existing he 
could have averted the accident. It is submitted that the 
court should have allowed the matter to go to the jury 
and accordingly the court erred in granting Defendant's 
1notions and entering its Findings of Fact and Judgment. 
It is respectfully prayed that the Judgment be reversed, 
and the matter returned to the trial court for new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. HOWE MOF1FAT 
WENDELL C. DAY 
Attorneys for Appell(J;nts. 
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